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Abstract. OpenID is a standard decentralized initiative aimed at allow-
ing Internet users to use the same personal account to access different
services. Since it does not rely on any central authority, it is hard for such
users or other entities to validate the trust level of each entity deployed
in the system. Some research has been conducted to handle this issue,
defining a reputation framework to determine the trust level of a rely-
ing party based on past experiences. However, this framework has been
proposed in a theoretical way and some deeper analysis and validation is
still missing. Our main contribution in this paper consist of a simulation
environment able to validate the feasibility of the reputation framework
and analyze its behaviour within different scenarios.
1 Introduction
OpenID [1] is an open technology standard which defines a decentralized authen-
tication protocol in order to allow end-users to sign in to multiple websites with
the same user account. It allows users to maintain their private information in a
single point, and release it to external entities when it is required in a controlled
way. For example, users could reveal their credit card number, which is securely
stored in their OpenID providers, to purchase an item in an online shop.
Due to its decentralized nature, OpenID technology does not rely on any
central authority which validates the trust level of the entities involved in the
system, such as the different OpenID providers or the service providers. In this
way, it is hard for users to decide whether a given service provider is trustwor-
thy enough to share their private information before interacting with it, which
actually implies sending such private information.
A reputation framework to be integrated with OpenID was defined in [2],
without requiring any central authority intervention. It describes how the OpenID
protocol can be enhanced so that each OpenID provider can collect recommen-
dations from different users on a given relying party, even if they belong to
different OpenID providers. These recommendations can be aggregated appro-
priately to provide useful information about the service to the users, such as
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whether it is trustworthy or not, before they start interacting with it. Such rep-
utation framework, however, is described in a theoretical way and there is not
a reference implementation or detailed description of the internal component
which can prove the feasibility of such a framework.
Our main contribution in this paper is presenting a simulation environment,
developed within NEC Laboratories Europe, able to analyze and validate the
feasibility of a number of reputation engines integrated with OpenID, including
the ones described in [2]. This simulator environment, entitled ROMEO (Rep-
utatiOn Model Enhancing OpenID Simulator), allows evaluating the capability
of malicious users or entities to exploit the reputation system. For instance, it is
able to analyze whether a relying party could increase its reputation introducing
biased recommendations to the system [3].
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some
related work to motivate our contribution. Section 3 introduces threats which any
simulator environment should consider to properly analyze this kind of systems.
Section 4 describes the internal components which define the architecture of the
framework, while section 5 presents the user interface of the simulator.
2 Background
The reputation framework described in [2] was designed for enhancing the OpenID
users’ experience when accessing a relying party. This framework allows OpenID
providers to aggregate recommendations about a given relying party from users
which have already interacted with it. This allows OpenID providers to inform
other users before interacting with the given relying party.
Since some of the OpenID providers would not have enough users to form
accurate reputation scores, that framework describes a mechanism to gather
recommendations from external sources. To know where to collect the recom-
mendations from, the OpenID providers ask the relying party for potential rec-
ommenders. The recommenders are mainly other OpenID providers which have
recently interacted with the relying party, hence having updated recommenda-
tions of the provided service.
Additionally, this framework considers users preferences to provide customized
reputation values [4]. When a reputation value is being computed for a given
user, the recommendations given by users with similar preferences to the given
one will have a higher importance in the computation of such reputation score.
Nevertheless, some of the gathered recommendations could be malicious or
inaccurate, for example if they are biased trying to increase or decrease the repu-
tation of certain relying parties. To solve this problem, the reputation framework
establishes dynamic weights to the sources of recommendations based on its ac-
curacy. Therefore, inaccurate recommendations sources will be punished, and its
recommendations will not be taken into account. However, this framework only
has been defined theoretically and a deep analysis and validation is still missing.
Several reputation simulators have been proposed to validate the feasibility
of reputation frameworks. ART testbed [5] and TOSim [6] have become a refer-
ence due to its flexibility and modularity, allowing researchers to easily compare
and analyze their trust and reputation models. P2P-SIM [7] presents a simu-
lator for evaluating P2P-based trust and reputation management algorithms.
It simulates the network structure, and outputs statistics about how the trust
management is performed. In a similar way, TRMSim-WSN [8] allows testing
and compare trust and reputation models, but within Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSN) scenarios. However, we have not found any testbed or simulator target-
ing reputation management mechanisms integrated within user-centric identity
management systems. Those simulation environments should take into account
the particularities of these specific reputation models, such as computing repu-
tation based on users’ preferences.
3 OpenID-integrated reputation frameworks threats
There are some aspects which can compromise the behaviour of the presented
reputation framework, and should be analyzed to determine its feasibility. In the
following, we present some relevant features and threats which should be taken
into consideration when designing a simulator.
– Relying parties could know the recommendation that each OpenID provider
has about them. Even though the framework just share recommendations
between OpenID providers, it would be easy for any relying party to deploy
an OpenID provider which asks for recommendation to the rest of them.
– Relying parties could offer services with diverse qualities. For instance, a
relying party could give low quality on the main services but offering several
low-cost with high quality services just for increasing its reputation, if it was
calculated as a global reputation instead of depending of the service.
– Quality of the services offered by the relying parties could vary during the
time. For example, a relying party with good reputation could suddenly
decrease the quality of its services.
– Relying Parties could fake the list of potential recommenders by including
just the recommenders which provide better recommendations about them.
In this case, the relying parties could try to increase their reputation since
only biased recommendation sources are taken into consideration.
– A relying party could decide not to participate in the reputation framework.
For example, due to lack of resources or to avoid low reputation values.
– There could be malicious OpenID providers which supply inaccurate recom-
mendations values trying to either increase or decrease the reputation value
of a given relying party.
– Users could provide inaccurate recommendations. That includes some users
who make mistakes when providing recommendations, and those deployed
by a malicious relying party trying to increase its reputation [9].
– The framework cannot assume unlimited resources to perform any of its pro-
cesses. Some of the defined processes may require a vast amount of storage,
computer or network resources to work properly. Furthermore, the response
times are critical to determine the success of the reputation framework.
– A malicious entity can present multiple identities, issuing a higher fraction
of the recommendations of the system, as a Sybil attack [10].
4 ROMEO Architecture overview
This section presents the internal components of the architecture developed to
simulate the reputation framework, as shown in Figure 1. The architecture has
been designed to allow an easy extension in order to validate different reputation
computation engine that may be defined in the future as part of OpenID. Next,
we describe each of the components belonging to the architecture.
Fig. 1. General ROMEO architecture overview
– Reputation Authority. This component is the interface for external en-
tities to make use of the reputation framework functionalities. Either the
OpenID provider in use sends internal queries to this module to obtain the
reputation value of a relying party or other OpenID providers ask this com-
ponent for gathering external recommendations. Additionally, this module
is also utilized by the users to provide recommendations once they have
interacted with the relying party, which feed the reputation framework.
– Rule Engine. Computing reputation values could be directed by certain
dynamic rules. For instance, if the system is overloaded, just the last 25
recommendations will be taken into account instead of all of them. The Rule
Engine component is in charge of evaluating these rules and influence the
rest of the reputation computation process.
– Preferences Engine. The preferences of the user which is asking for rep-
utation could be taken into account when computing the reputation values.
This component processes the preferences of the user and establishes cer-
tain parameters according to them, which will influence the weights of the
recommendations of other users when computing the reputation score.
– Reputation Manager. This component is the controller of the reputation
architecture. By using the rest of the components, this component manages
the internal and external recommendations and aggregates them using a
specific Computation Engine when a reputation value is requested.
– Reputation Store. This component is in charge of maintaining recommen-
dations from different users or OpenID providers which have been gathered
in the past. It also maintains a weight together with each recommendation
in order to determine the accuracy of the recommender. Additionally, this
module may act as a cache by storing computed reputation values during
a while, which avoids computing the same reputation value again when the
users ask for it in a short period of time.
– Data Collector. The Data Collector component is used by the Reputation
Manager to collect external recommendations. This component retrieves the
list of potential recommenders from a given relying party and then asks each
of these recommenders (i.e. other OpenID providers) for recommendations
about the relying party.
– Computation Engines. This set of components is the core of the reputa-
tion framework since it is in charge of aggregating reputation values from
the recommendations and its associated weights. A different Computation
Engine could be used depending on some systems conditions, such as the
current network load. Hence, a common interface is defined so they could
be interchangeable. Additionally, this module also adjusts the weights of
the recommendations sources based on their accuracy in order to punish or
reward such recommendations sources for future reputation computation.
5 Reputation Model Enhancing OpenID Simulator
ROMEO (ReputatiOn Model Enhancing OpenID) is the performed simulator,
within NEC Laboratories Europe, aimed to evaluate reputation frameworks in-
tegrated with OpenID, such as the one presented in [2]. It allows evaluating the
capability of malicious users or entities (or groups of them) to exploit the reputa-
tion system. That is, if they could increase or decrease the reputation of a given
relying party by supplying biased recommendations. Furthermore, it analyzes
how different reputation computation engines are adapted to different scenarios.
5.1 Scenario elements
As shown in Figure 2, ROMEO presents a graphical interface where different
reputation-based scenarios could be defined. A scenario is composed of simu-
lated users belonging to different simulated OpenID providers interacting with a
specific relying party under certain conditions. Such conditions are parametrized
to configure the behaviour of the different elements in the system. This config-
uration includes some of the aspects defined in Section 3. For instance, defining
whether (and how) the relying party will variate its QoS. It also includes con-
figuration over the different reputation computation engines to determine which
configuration adapts better to the defined scenario.
Fig. 2. ROMEO simulator graphical interface screenshot
To cover the rest of the aspects described in Section 3, and taking into ac-
count other different reputation threats [3], we have defined and included in
the simulator the following types of users, OpenID providers and relying parties
acting in the system.
– Type of users:
• Normal: These users provide appropriate recommendations according
to the relying party quality of service.
• Negative or Positive raters: These users always provides bad (nega-
tive raters) or good (positive raters) recommendations when giving feed-
backs, regardless of the quality of the received service.
– Type of OpenID providers:
• Normal raters: These OpenID providers properly follows the reputa-
tion framework definition. That is, they do not try to cheat when they
provide recommendations.
• Negative or Positive raters: These OpenID providers always give
bad (negative raters) or good (positive raters) recommendations about
the relying party, regardless of its real behaviour, trying to decrease or
increase its global reputation.
• Camouflaged positive/negative raters: This kind of OpenID provider
is an extension of the previous one. It gives good or bad recommenda-
tion, regardless of the real quality of service, but only p% of the times.
The rest of times, (100− p)%, it has a normal behaviour.
• Sybil positive/negative raters: These OpenID providers act as pos-
itive or negative raters, but additionally, after a while, they replace its
identity with a new one.
– Type of relying party:
• Normal: The relying party properly follows the behaviour of the frame-
work without trying to cheat its reputation.
• Malicious: The relying party includes in the recommenders list only the
ones with better recommendations about itself.
• Sybil: The relying party is disconnected and replaced with a new identity
from time to time, reinitializing its associated reputation.
• Not participative: The relying party does not return the recommender
list.
Once defined the scenario, the simulator starts the simulation environment.
The simulation consists of executing a determined number of iterations. In each
iteration, some of the simulated users want to access a service offered by the
relying party, so they access the OpenID provider they belong to and ask for
the reputation value of the relying party. Then, the OpenID provider collects
recommendations using the technique described in Section 2 and computes a
reputation score according the weight given to each recommender.
If the relying party has enough reputation, the user will interact with the
relying party and will provide a feedback according to the quality of the received
service, and depending on the type of user. Finally, the OpenID provider adjusts
the weights of its recommendation according to the received feedback.
5.2 Visualization of results
After running a simulation, the simulator shows three different charts, repre-
senting three different ways of analyzing the results. These charts are described
in the following.
– Results chart. The Results chart compares the real Relying Party QoS in
each moment with the average reputation value given by the Normal OpenID
Providers. It is useful to see the behaviour of the reputation model against a
specific scenario. For instance, whether it is resilient against malicious users
or OpenID Providers or how long does it take to calculate the real reputation
value.
– Accuracy chart. Taking into account that the users interact with the rely-
ing party with a probability p, being p the reputation given by its OpenID
Provider, this chart determines how many users interact with a given rely-
ing party. This chart is useful to compare different reputation computation
engines regarding their accuracy when calculating reputation scores.
– User Satisfaction chart. It indicates how satisfied the users are with the
recommendations given by the OpenID Providers, and hence with the rep-
utation framework. This chart is useful to compare different computation
engines regarding the adaptation to users preferences. In other words, the
more the computed reputation scores fit to each user, according to her pref-
erences, the higher will be the user’s satisfaction.
6 Conclusions
Nowadays, a lot of service providers are including the OpenID standard solution
as part of the authentication and basic access control services provided to their
users. However, due to its decentralized nature, OpenID technology does not rely
on any central authority which validates the trust level of the entities involved
in the system, becoming a point where malicious service providers could try to
gain access to the private attributes of users and make profit with them.
Some research has been done describing solutions helping to mitigate this
problem. However, proposed solutions for this specific case still need some deep
analysis and validation. In this paper we have presented a set of relevant fea-
tures which should be taken into consideration to evaluate a reputation frame-
work build on top of the OpenID standard. Based on this features, we have
described a simulation environment able to validate the feasibility of such repu-
tation frameworks and analyze their behaviour within different scenarios.
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